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I Introduction
In writing a piece on the outer boundaries of the free movement provisions, it is inevitable to be forced to revisit very familiar concepts and case law. This investigation has led to findings that the present author had not anticipated: naively, one could have thought that the outer boundaries of the free movement of goods were a settled affair with the exception of the relationship between the doctrine of 'effect too uncertain and indirect' and the Keck selling arrangements. After all, the Keck ruling, 1 for all its faults, helped both commentators and national courts to determine when a rule would fall within Article 28 EC: a product requirement is always caught while rules regulating the modalities of sale would in principle, and lacking discrimination, fall outside the scope of that provision. And yet, as noted by
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3 the level of taxation to the proportionality assessment required once a rule is found to fall within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions.
This contribution will analyse these issues; it will start by introducing the reader to alternative conceptual backgrounds to the Keck ruling. It will then turn to a scrutiny of the doctrine of 'effect too uncertain and indirect'; and the case law on selling arrangements. In this respect, it will highlight how the 'refinement' of the Court's approach might signal a change in the very nature of the Keck presumption. It will then conclude with a brief analysis of the free movement of persons provisions, focusing on the different approach adopted in relation to tax rules.
II Redefining the Boundaries after Keck: Policy Decision or
Coherent Hermeneutic Choice?
The Keck settlement hardly needs repeating: faced with increasing criticism as well as the prospect of an unmanageable case load, 4 the Court decided to exclude, as a matter of principle, some rules from the scope of the Treaty unless such rules were found to be directly or indirectly discriminatory. 5 As a result, following the Keck ruling the test for assessing whether a non-directly discriminatory rule is to be defined as a measure having equivalent effect, 6 and therefore needs to be justified, seems to be-for practical purposes-tripartite.
First, product requirements always fall within the scope of Article 28 EC, without there being any need to prove discrimination or a specific effect on intraCommunity trade. 7 Secondly, selling arrangements fall within the scope of Article 28 EC only insofar as they are directly or indirectly discriminatory, 8 and possibly in the case in which they prevent access to the market of imported goods. However, this will not be the case when the effect of the rule on intra-Community trade is too uncertain and indirect to trigger Article 28 EC.
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The landscape of the free movement of goods, and in particular of what exactly is to be considered a measure having equivalent effect to a restriction on imports, is therefore still varied even after the Keck ruling. In this respect, while the ruling has introduced a very useful system of presumptions to assess the need for justification of domestic rules (product requirements always fall in, selling arrangements mostly not, and for other rules it depends), it has not done much to clarify the outer boundaries of Article 28 EC, and the rationale underlying the case law.
More specifically, in relation to 'certain selling arrangements', the reasoning in Keck carries a presumption that, at first, seemed not rebuttable: such rules are not 14 Case C-189/95 Criminal proceedings against H Franzén [1997] excluded from the scope of the Treaty not because of a policy decision of sorts, but simply because they do not have an effect on intra-Community trade. As a result, the rationale behind the Keck ruling would be the same as the rationale behind the doctrine of 'effect too uncertain and indirect': in both cases the Treaty does not apply because there is no effect on the free movement of goods.
As we shall see in the next sections, both explanations of the Keck ruling reflect, at different times, the Court's case law. Thus, it will be argued that in the aftermath of the ruling, the almost mechanical application of the Keck presumption might lead to the conclusion that it was best qualified as a policy decision, thus ECR I-6269, the Court, much as it did in V Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH(n 23), held that when the effect of a rule depends also on the unforeseeable decisions of economic operators, then the rule's effect is too uncertain and indirect to be considered an obstacle falling within Art 28 EC.
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The ruling in Semeraro Casa Uno, 38 seems to support the fact that the 'effect too uncertain and indirect' doctrine applies only to non-trading rules. The case concerned Sunday trading rules and whether they were compatible with both the free movement of goods and the freedom of establishment. The Court found that the rules fell outside the scope of Article 28 EC pursuant to the Keck ruling; and that they fell outside the scope of Article 43 EC since they were non-discriminatory; they were not intended to regulate the conditions for establishment; and their effect was too uncertain and indirect to affect the freedom of establishment. The different approach adopted to scrutinise the same rules signals therefore that selling arrangements and rules the effect of which is too uncertain and indirect are conceptually distinct.
In particular, and as explained by Advocate General La Pergola in BASF, 39 in the latter case there is no causal link between rule and alleged restriction and for this reason the Dassonville formula, or the other free movement provisions, cannot apply.
On the other hand, in relation to selling arrangements there might be an effect on intra-Community trade (for instance the reduction of the total volume of sales) and yet this effect is not relevant for the application of Article 28 EC. where the Court dismissed as irrelevant the German Government's contention that rules restricting the expiry dates of certain products to two a year should not fall within the scope of Art 28 EC since the trader was in any event obliged to alter the packaging in order for the information to be given in German.
15 same however does not appear to be true in relation to non-trading rules: whilst a potential effect might be sufficient (there is no authority either way), it still needs to be proven.
IV Back to Dassonville?
The Case Law Certain Selling Arrangements
From the cursory analysis carried out above, it seems that the doctrine of 'effect too uncertain and indirect' and the Keck a priori exclusion of some non-discriminatory rules from the scope of Article 28 EC can be kept distinct. Whilst both are tools to exclude the application of Article 28 EC, the former applies to non-trading rules which have no causal connection with the alleged barrier; whilst the latter applies to non-discriminatory trading rules of a certain type. The significance of this difference will then depend on whether certain selling arrangements are trading rules which lack a sufficient causal connection with the alleged barrier to intra-Community trade; or whether such rules are excluded because of a priori decision as to the appropriate level at which regulation should be enacted (or in certain instances because of an a priori decision as to the merit of the legislation in question). In the former case, the only difference between the doctrine of effect 'too uncertain and indirect' and Keck would rest on the type of rule to which the respective doctrines are applied and the two doctrines could be easily merged into one test (albeit they still might be kept separate for ease of convenience theoretical reasoning to find that the rules were indirectly discriminatory, therefore relieving the traders from the need to prove any existence of factual discrimination.
Or consider the ruling in Morellato. 56 There the issue related to packaging and labelling requirements for bake-off products, that is bakery products which are preprepared and undergo only the final stage of baking in the premises where they are sold. The Court found that the rules at issue were not product requirements since they did not entail the need to modify the imported product. Since the rules related to the marketing stage they were to be considered as selling arrangements. The Court then held that there was unjustified factual discrimination. It based its finding on the fact that, since such products were not manufactured in Italy, the rules disadvantaged imported products only, in that they discouraged their imports or made the products less attractive to consumers. This broad interpretation of discrimination is at odds with established case law in relation to discriminatory taxation, where the Court has held that when there is no domestic production of goods similar to or in competition with the imported product there cannot be any discrimination; 57 as well as with the Court's own finding in the milk for infants case. 58 In the latter case, the Commission brought proceedings against Greece in relation to rules which restricted the possibility to sell processed milk for infants to pharmacies. The Court held that the fact that Whilst it might be argued that the Italian rules in Morellato might have had some protectionist effect in that they placed Italian in-store baked bread at an advantage, there is no indication in the ruling that that was the rationale underpinning the Court's reasoning.
Similarly, in Gourmet there is little discussion of discrimination: it might be recalled that the rules at issue prohibited the advertising of alcoholic products. 59 In particular, the Swedish Government had submitted evidence to the effect that the sale of whisky and wine, mainly imported, had grown in comparison with the sale of vodka, mainly home-produced. The Court dismissed the evidence by holding that it could not be precluded that in the absence of the legislation at issue the switch in consumers' preferences would have been greater 60 (a probatio diabolica if ever there was one). 61 While, again, it could be argued that a prohibition on advertising affects intra-Community trade regardless of discrimination (but then Keck should not apply to such rules), the reasoning of the Court, or part thereof, seems more driven by the desire that the rules at issue would be subject to justification, than by a grounded assessment of discrimination. for pharmacies not established in Germany, the internet provides a more significant way to gain direct access to the German market. A prohibition which has a greater impact on pharmacies established outside German territory could impede access to the market for products from other Member States more than it impedes access for domestic products (para 74).
On the other hand, in Burmanjer a prior authorisation requirement for the itinerant sale of periodicals was found not to be indirectly discriminatory; 64 and in A-Punkt the same conclusion was reached in relation to rules prohibiting door-to-door sales of 62 
Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdiest Sass GmbH (n 49).
63 Deutscher Apothekerverband eV, 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacque Waterval (n 52). 
C The Boundary Between Selling Arrangements and Other Rules
The third strand of case law that deserves attention is that in which the Court is called upon to assess the boundary between rules that fall within the scope of the Keck exception, and those which fall outside the 'certain' selling arrangements that benefit from a narrower application of Article 28 EC. In this respect, whilst rules which require the modification of the imported product can never be qualified as a selling arrangement, 69 in certain cases rules which concern the modalities of sale might be excluded from the Keck exception; 70 and in other cases it is more difficult to decide whether the rule does fall within the 'selling arrangement' category. 72 In the former case the rules were found to be non-discriminatory selling arrangements, whilst in the latter case the rules were found to fall outside the Keck exception and were therefore subject to the full force of the Dassonville formula. And yet, the rules at issue in the two cases both concerned a licensing requirement whereby the sale of given products was reserved to authorised retailers.
Or compare the rules at issue in the case of Morellato with the rules at issue in Alfa Vita. As we have seen, in Morellato, rules concerning the packaging of bake-off products were found to be selling arrangements; as a result, the Court had to rely on a broad (and not entirely consistent) finding of discrimination in order to subject the rules to the proportionality assessment. 73 On the other hand, in Alfa Vita rules restricting the sale of bread baked on the premises to stores which complied with all the requirements prescribed for bread-making establishments were found not to be selling arrangements since they did not take into consideration the specific nature of bake-off products; they entailed additional costs; and they made the marketing of bake-off products more difficult. 74 In this respect, there seems to be some confusion so that the assessment of the effect of the rule is relevant in determining whether the 
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rule is a certain selling arrangement. In this way, the focus shifts back from assessing the 'type' of rule, to assessing its 'effect'.
It therefore seems that far from having introduced a rigid distinction, the application of the Keck ruling will very much depend on the specifics of the case at issue. And yet, in order to understand why certain selling arrangements are excluded from the scope of Article 28 EC, it is important to identify the rationale behind the Court's decisions.
V Possible Explanations for the Exclusion of Certain Selling
Arrangements from the Scope of Article 28 EC
The most obvious explanation for the exclusion of certain selling arrangements from the scope of Article 28 EC is that suggested by the Court in Keck itself. Certain rules are excluded from the scope of the Treaty because, provided they are not discriminatory, they neither prevent market access nor impede it more than they impede it for domestic goods. However, and as this might be certainly true for some cases, 75 such an explanation does not help in understanding the different approaches to discrimination, or the reason why some rules which seem similar, and which relate to the way a product can be sold, are classified sometimes as a certain selling arrangement, and sometimes not. For instance, a prohibition on door-to-door sales 75 See especially those analysed in Section IVA above on the mechanical application of the Keck clarifies that a mere reduction in the volume of sales is not, in itself, enough to trigger Article 28 EC; and it introduces a presumption to the effect that certain rules are normally not liable to affect directly or indirectly, actually or potentially intraCommunity trade. Thus, some selling arrangements do not affect intra-Community trade in that any effect they have is an effect on trade as a whole and not specifically on trade in goods that have crossed a border. However, some rules concerning selling arrangements might have a specific effect on intra-Community trade, in which case they will be subject to scrutiny by either a broad interpretation of discrimination or by the exclusion of the applicability of the Keck presumption. Thus, for instance, the ruling in TK-Heimdienst seems consistent with the fact that Community law illtolerates any establishment/residence requirement, even though the willingness of out-27 of-State traders to engage in the commercial practice at issue might be extremely unlikely (if not altogether remote). The ruling in DocMorris is fully justified should one consider the effectiveness of internet sales as a means to penetrate foreign markets. The licensing requirement in Franzén had an effect on intra-Community trade which the rules in Banchero lacked because of the extremely restrictive nature of the rules on the sales of alcoholic beverages in Sweden (as was also the case in Gourmet) compared to the non-restrictive effect of the Italian licensing rules on tobacco. 76 The Swedish rules were aimed at discouraging consumption of alcohol; the Italian rules, on the other hand, were aimed at guaranteeing access to tobacco products throughout the national territory, including remote rural communities.
Similarly, the rules in Morellato and Alfa Vita had the effect of making it excessively (and unnecessarily) difficult for a product, bake-off bread, which had traditionally not been sold in Italy and Spain, to be sold in those countries.
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The focus on the effect on intra-Community trade rather than on the nature of the measure would also explain why rules that might be considered similar from an ontological viewpoint, such as licensing, authorisation or equipment requirements, are de facto treated in a different way depending on the circumstances. And again it would explain the ruling in Dynamic Medien. 78 There, the rules at issue prohibited the sale by post of videos, movies and videogames which did not bear an age-limit label 76 See also 
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corresponding to a classification decision of one of the competent bodies. Advocate
General Mengozzi considered the rules to be certain selling arrangements because they concerned modalities of sale; the Court, on the other hand, in order to justify the exclusion of the Keck exception, focused also on the double burden that such rules would introduce in relation to those movies which had already undergone a similar scrutiny in the country of origin. However, regardless of the rules of the country of origin, it is clear that such rules affected the possibility of importing movies into Germany in that they required the goods to be subjected to the competent board to assess suitability for given age groups.
This said, the exclusion of the application of Article 28 EC in Burmanjer and
A-Punkt is still puzzling and might lead to the finding that the disparate application of the Keck formula indicates that certain rules are to be considered as barriers to intraCommunity trade only when their effect is more than minimal. And yet, the Court has so far refused to adopt a de minimis approach in relation to the free movement provisions. 79 Furthermore, a de minimis approach would fail to explain why some licensing rules have an 'appreciable' effect on trade, whilst rules that restrict consumption of a product to a certain age group would (almost certainly) not. 
VI Peralta and
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At the beginning of this analysis we pointed out how the Keck ruling could be interpreted in two different ways, either as a decision aimed at excluding some rules from the scope of the Treaty for policy reasons; or, as a decision which merely rectified the mistaken interpretation given to Article 28 EC during the Sunday trading saga according to which a mere reduction in the volume of sales was enough to attract the rules within the ambit of the 'potential' restriction of intra-Community trade pursuant to the Dassonville ruling. The choice between the two alternative explanations is important to understand the scope of the Treaty both in order to determine the extent to which the Keck presumption is open to rebuttal and to assess the relationship between the remoteness doctrine and the Keck ruling.
In this respect, it has been argued that while at the beginning the almost mechanical application of the Keck ruling suggested that it was a policy decision, the fine-tuning of its application in more recent years suggests that it is simply a tool to tame the excesses inherent in the broad Dassonville formula. Thus, the flexible ad hoc approach to discrimination, together with the ease with which the Court excludes certain rules from the 'certain selling arrangements' category, suggests that Keck simply introduces a useful system of presumptions as to which rules are more likely to affect intra-Community trade. In this respect, the only certainty after Keck seems to be that Sunday trading rules fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC (much as they fall outside the scope of the other free movement provisions).
Thus Keck, far from introducing a rigid dichotomy where the test applied to assess the existence of a barrier to intra-Community trade depends on the type of rules at issue, simply introduces a useful and flexible system of presumptions. In this respect, if the crucial factor in the application of Article 28 EC is still the 'effect' on intra-Community trade, then there is a common rationale underlying the case law on remoteness and the Keck doctrine. However, the two still differ for two reasons. First of all, the remoteness doctrine applies only to non-trading rules; secondly, it is only in the case of these rules that the claimant has to establish causation. This said, the rationale behind rules excluded pursuant to the application of the Keck presumptions and rules excluded because of the remoteness doctrine is the same:
both rules do not have an effect on intra-Community trade relevant for the application of the Treaty. It seems therefore that Keck is less revolutionary than it might have appeared at first sight and the rigidity of the Keck formula is only apparent: what matters at the end is still whether the rules under scrutiny create a barrier to intraCommunity trade. If they do not, they will benefit from the Keck exception; but if they do they will be scrutinised either through a broad interpretation of discrimination; or by a limitation of the scope of Keck itself. The free movement of persons provisions catch, as well as directly and indirectly discriminatory rules, rules which hinder or discourage movement. 84 The notion of hindrance/discouragement is interpreted in a generous way; 85 and, the intraCommunity element necessary to trigger the Treaty has been considerably relaxed.
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However, notwithstanding this broad interpretation there appear to be some limit to the scope of the free movement of persons provisions. The doctrine of 'effect too uncertain and indirect' applies also to the free movement of persons; and in some other cases (notably tax cases, but also social security cases) the interpretation of the free movement provisions seems narrower and limited to an assessment of discrimination. We shall consider these situations in turn.
A The Doctrine of Effect too Uncertain and Indirect and the Ruling in Deliège
The rationale underpinning the doctrine of 'effect too uncertain and indirect' is the same regardless of the Treaty freedom invoked. As we have seen above, in order for 83 The doctrine of effect too uncertain and indirect applies also to the free movement of capital; see In any event, it should be noted that the doctrine of effect 'too uncertain and indirect' has been applied more seldom in the field of persons, and indeed it is open to debate as to whether it is of any real significance. In particular, it could be queried whether the standard of proof required in order to be able to challenge rules that do not regulate intra-Community movement or the conditions for the exercise of the relevant freedom is any higher than that required to challenge rules regulating movement. Here, consider that in the case of natural persons the factors that might deter movement might not necessarily be linked to the conditions on the exercise of an economic activity. Thus, for instance, the rights of family members might be much more important to the migrant citizen than the need to fulfil an administrative requirement in order to pursue an economic activity. It is not surprising therefore that in these cases there seems no need to prove causation, either because it is given for granted; or simply because the scope of the Treaty free movement of persons provisions is broader. within their territory with the possible (and so far theoretical) exception of taxation which is so high as to impede the free movement of goods.
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In relation to the free movement of persons there is no provision equivalent to Article 90 EC; for this reason, discriminatory/protectionist taxation falls squarely within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions. While this fact did not give rise to any problem when the scope of those provisions was limited to a prohibition on discrimination, the matter changed slightly once the Court decided to broaden the scope of the Treaty so as to include all rules which hindered or discouraged movement. It is obvious that high taxation might create a deterrent to movement; and yet, it is also obvious that the decision as to the level of taxation is, by its very nature, a political choice (possibly the 'most' political choice) and that therefore it should not be subject to the proportionality assessment by the Court of Justice. 94 It is therefore not surprising that overall the Court has not engaged in the review of the level of taxation and, indeed, it has made clear that the rights granted by the Treaty do not entail the guarantee that movement will be neutral from a fiscal viewpoint. 95 tax rules, by definition, have an impact on the profitability of business; and such an impact is inherent in the very nature of tax rules which are aimed at imposing charges on economic operators to finance public expenditure. In the same way as it is unconceivable to have international tournaments without having rules governing the selection of participants to such competitions, it is unconceivable to have taxation which would not determine expenditure on those who are subject to it. Thus, those
rules cannot be considered as a barrier because their effect on intra-Community movement is inherent in their aim, an aim which is a priori compatible with Community law.
The Déliège line of reasoning differs then from the Keck-style reasoning. The latter is a policy decision: tax rules are barriers to intra-Community movement but they are best left to the Member States. The Déliège line of reasoning, on the other hand, is conceptual: when the alleged barrier coincides with the very purpose of the rules-be it selecting athletes, or raising funds for the public purse-then, provided the aim in itself is legitimate, any effect that the rule might have on movement is inherent in the rules at issue and therefore cannot be scrutinised. The Keck-style
reasoning leaves it open for the Court to change its policy; the Déliège reasoning defines the boundaries of the free movement provisions and acknowledges that facing a disadvantage, a loss in profit, is not enough to claim that a barrier to intraCommunity movement was raised.
VIII Conclusions 41
The co-existence of different strands of case law, together with the use of different hermeneutic tools in relation to the same provisions, makes it extremely difficult to identify clear boundaries for the Treaty free movement provisions. Indeed, when the cases are closely scrutinised one might be excused for feeling a slight sense of desperation as to the chaotic picture arising from the Court's jurisprudence. The number of variables influencing the outcome of a case, as well as reasoning which is at times erratic, makes the scholar's job all the more difficult. In this respect, one should accept that it will never be possible to provide an umbrella under which all cases can sit comfortably. Furthermore, one should always be aware that the rationale underpinning the interpretation of the free movement provisions is fluid: it evolves as our perception of the problems and aims of the internal market changes with time.
This is particularly visible in relation to the free movement of goods. In this respect, it should never be forgotten that the Keck ruling was a reaction to a specific problemthat of an excessively broad interpretation of Article 28 EC.
It is, therefore, not surprising that in the aftermath of the Keck ruling the main hermeneutic effort was directed at providing a clearer demarcation of the Treaty, so as to relocate the balancing exercise inherent in the proportionality assessment demanded by the mandatory requirements doctrine in the hands of national regulators.
The mechanical application of Keck can then be properly understood as a policy decision aimed at correcting the imbalances created by the Sunday trading interpretation. However, with time, the application of Keck becomes more nuanced and the focus seems to shift back to the assessment of the effect on intra-Community trade of the rules under scrutiny. In this way, the rigid system of presumptions which characterised the Keck ruling evolves into a flexible system of presumptions which is still useful but not conclusive. Indeed, it could be noted that should one leave aside 42 the Sunday trading incident, the pre-Keck case law and the post-Keck case law are strikingly similar.
In relation to the free movement of persons, and contrary to expectations, it is easier to identify the outer boundaries. Thus, the broader interpretation given to those provisions, as controversial as this might be, gives rise to a jurisprudence which is more internally consistent. The applicability of the Treaty freedoms is excluded only in relation to a handful of situations where it is impossible to establish a causal effect between rule and alleged barrier. And, in cases where the effect of the rule complained about, an effect which is a priori deemed legitimate in the Community system, is inherent in the very aim that the rule seeks to pursue. Taxes inherently inconvenience tax payers: it would be foolhardy to interpret such an inconvenience as a barrier to movement.
